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Abstract
In this paper, we present an idea of adopting certificateless public key encryption (CL-PKE) schemes over
mobile ad hoc network (MANET), which has not been explored before. In current literature, essentially
there exists two main approaches, namely the public key cryptography and identity-based (ID-based)
cryptography. Unfortunately, they both have some inherent drawbacks. In the public key cryptography
system, a certificate authority (CA) is required to issue certificates between users' public keys and private
keys to ensure their authenticity, whilst in an ID-based cryptography system, users' private keys are
generated by a key generation center (KGC), which means the KGC knows every users' keys (the key
escrow problem). To avoid these obstacles, Al-Riyami and Paterson proposed certificateless cryptography
systems where the public keys do not need to be certified and the KGC does not know users' keys.
Essentially, certificateless cryptography relies between the public key cryptography and ID-based
cryptography. In this work, we adopt this system's advantage over MANET. To implement CL-PKE over
MANET and to make it practical, we incorporate the idea of Shamir's secret sharing scheme. The master
secret keys are shared among some or all the MANET nodes. This makes the system self-organized once
the network has been initiated. In order to provide more flexibility, we consider both a full distribution
system and a partial distribution system. Furthermore, we carry out two simulations to support our
schemes. We firstly simulate our scheme to calculate our encryption, decryption and key distribution
efficiency. Then we also simulate our scheme with AODV to test the network efficiency. The simulations
are performed over OPNET.
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Abstract

Keywords: certiﬁcateless cryptography, MANET,
AODV, OPNET, public key cryptography, identityIn this paper, we present an idea of adopting certiﬁ- based cryptography, secret sharing
cateless public key encryption (CL-PKE) schemes over
mobile ad hoc network (MANET), which has not been
1 Introduction
explored before. In current literature, essentially there
exists two main approaches, namely the public key
The mobile ad hoc network (MANET) is a network
cryptography and identity-based (ID-based) cryptogthat is merely comprised of mobiles devices without
raphy. Unfortunately, they both have some inherent
any pre-established infrastructures. In this type of netdrawbacks. In the public key cryptography system, a
work, routing is an essential problem, since unlike a
certiﬁcate authority (CA) is required to issue certiﬁtraditional network, MANET has no access point for
cates between users’ public keys and private keys to
the nodes to connect to and communicate. With the
ensure their authenticity, whilst in an ID-based crypfast development of MANET technology, security betography system, users’ private keys are generated by
comes an important issue. With more and more apa key generation center (KGC), which means the KGC
plications developed over MANET devices, the need
knows every users’ keys (the key escrow problem). To
for MANET security has increased signiﬁcantly over
avoid these obstacles, Al-Riyami and Paterson prothe last few years. One of the main discussion points
posed certiﬁcateless cryptography systems where the
in this topic is the key distribution schemes. Several
public keys do not need to be certiﬁed and the KGC
solutions have been proposed in the literature, but nevdoes not know users’ keys. Essentially, certiﬁcateless
ertheless they have raised several drawbacks, such as
cryptography relies between the public key cryptogthe reliance on a single online authority [8, 5] or the
raphy and ID-based cryptography. In this work, we
unconditional trust to a trusted authority in the IDadopt this system’s advantage over MANET. To imbased system [4]. When the schemes are built from
plement CL-PKE over MANET and to make it pracpublic key cryptography, it will require certiﬁcate autical, we incorporate the idea of Shamir’s secret sharthorization that makes it impractical. Nonetheless, an
ing scheme. The master secret keys are shared among
ID-based system requires a signiﬁcant amount of trust
some or all the MANET nodes. This makes the system
to a single entity which also makes it impractical.
self-organized once the network has been initiated. In
Our Contribution
order to provide more ﬂexibility, we consider both a
full distribution system and a partial distribution sys- In this paper, we consider a diﬀerent approach to the
tem. Furthermore, we carry out two simulations to existing solutions, namely to incorporate the certiﬁsupport our schemes. We ﬁrstly simulate our scheme cateless cryptography into MANET. As we shall show
to calculate our encryption, decryption and key distri- in this paper, the adoption of certiﬁcateless cryptogbution eﬃciency. Then we also simulate our scheme raphy to the MANET scenario is not very straightforwith AODV to test the network eﬃciency. The simu- ward. Nonetheless, by combining the secret sharing
lations are performed over OPNET.
schemes with the certiﬁcateless cryptography, we ob1
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tain an eﬃcient and secure MANET scheme. Our contribution is to apply the existing certiﬁcateless cryptography into MANET using a threshold secret sharing scheme. We ﬁrstly create a generic model based on
the above ideas and then we proposed our scheme that
comprises of a combination of certiﬁcateless cryptography and secret sharing scheme. To support our idea,
we implement our schemes in OPNET to analyze its
eﬃciency and practicality.

Identity-based Cryptography The concept of
identity-based (ID-based) cryptography was introduced by Shamir in [13] to solve the main drawback
of public key cryptography by removing the necessity
of the certiﬁcates. In an ID-based system, the identity of users are used as their public keys and therefore there is no need to have this public keys (i.e. the
users’ identity) certiﬁed. The secret key is derived from
the user’s identity together with the trusted authority,
called the Private Key Generator (PKG)’s secret key.
Nonetheless, this makes the system impractical since
the PKG will know all the secret keys that the users
have and therefore, the PKG can always impersonate
any users. This inherent problem in ID-based cryptography is known as the key escrow problem, which
makes the ID-based system only practical in a closed
organization. An unconditional trust to the PKG is
required and it is assumed that the PKG will not be
malicious.

Paper Organization
The rest of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we
will review the background required throughout this
paper that includes the background on cryptography,
MANET and some existing MANET key management
schemes. In Section 3, we will propose our scheme that
comprises of a combination of certiﬁcateless cryptography and secret sharing scheme. In Section 4, we present
the result of our simulation in both C language and
OPNET. Finally, the last Section concludes the paper.

2
2.1

Certiﬁcateless Cryptography In 2003, Al-Riyami
and Paterson [3] proposed a new system known as
certiﬁcateless cryptography. The idea of certiﬁcateless
cryptography is to gather the strength of both the public key cryptography and ID-based cryptography and
to avoid the drawbacks that these two systems have. In
this system, there is a trusted authority called the Key
Generation Centre (KGC) that will need to generate a
partial secret key for the users, given the users’ identity.
Nonetheless, each user also needs to generate his/her
own partial secret key and based on these two pieces of
information (partial secret keys), the user can generate
the public key that needs to be published. Although
this system incorporates a public key, this public key
does not need to be certiﬁed as this public key has been
‘implicitly’ certiﬁed by the partial secret key issued by
the KGC. Hence, to verify the authenticity of the public key, the KGC’s public key needs to be involved. We
note that there is no key escrow problem in this model
as the KGC does not know the user’s secret key. The
KGC can only know the partial secret key but not the
complete secret key as some part of the secret key is
generated by the user himself/herself.

Background
Certiﬁcateless Cryptography

Public Key Cryptography The concept of the
public key cryptography scheme was put forth by Diﬃe
and Hellman in their seminal paper in [11] and the
ﬁrst realization of the public key cryptography was proposed by Rivest, Shamir and Adleman in 1978 [1]. In a
public key cryptography system, there are two separate
keys involved: the public key and the private key. In
an encryption scheme scenario, the public key is used
for encrypting the message and the private key is used
to decrypt the message. The main idea of this system relies on the fact that if the private key is known,
then it is easy to compute the public key, but not vice
versa. Therefore, the public key can be made public
and known by anyone. This method makes it possible for a user to deliver some messages without any
pre-established shared keys.
Nonetheless, the key management is the main stumbling block in the public key scenario, since it is not
possible for anyone who obtains someone’s public key
from a public place, such as the Internet, to verify the
authenticity of this public key. Therefore, there is a
necessity to authenticate this public key and hence, an
adversary cannot replace a genuine public key with any
other public key of its choice. Henceforth, a trusted
third party called the certiﬁcation authority (CA) is
required. The role of the CA is to issue certiﬁcates on
public keys for users. Then, anyone who obtains any
user’s public key can verify its authenticity by verifying
whether the certiﬁcate attached is indeed valid. This
is the main drawback of this system.

2.2

Mobile Ad Hoc Network

MANET Overview Mobile Ad-hoc Network
(MANET) is one of the most widely discussed and researched areas in the ﬁeld of wireless communications.
In a traditional network, mobile devices connect to
each other via an access point. If the access point
fails, users cannot communicate to each other. In the
MANET scenario, no access point or node is required.
MANET is a network that only consists of mobile
2
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devices such as personal digital assistants (PDAs)
and laptops. It requires no centralized infrastructure
like basic switch centers or wireless routers. Nodes
connect to each other via the ad hoc model. Nodes
work not only as a host but also as a router, joining
or leaving the network at any moment, making the
network highly dynamic.
Because of MANET’s non-centralized infrastructure
and highly dynamic characteristics, routing is an essential part of this network. Without routing, devices
are unable to connect to each other, and the network
becomes crippled. Routing protocols for the Internet
do not perform very well in MANET. Routes may become invalid at any second, which may be caused by
a slight movement of one node. In this case, dynamic
adaptive routing protocols must be applied.

Existing
Schemes

Key

Management

Partially distributed authority scheme Partially distributed authority scheme was ﬁrstly proposed
by Zhou and Hass [8]. In their scheme it is assumed
that there is an Oﬄine Trust Third Party (OTTP)
constructing and distributing keys for all the nodes.
Firstly, this OTTP generates a pair of master public/secret keys. The master public key (mpk) is known
by every node in the MANET, while the master secret
key (msk) is divided into n parts, where each part is
presented by Si (i = 0, 1, 2...n). Then OTTP picks n
arbitrary nodes, randomly distributed with msk parts.
These n nodes collectively form the Distributed Certiﬁcate Authority (DCA).
The OTTP then generates certiﬁcates for all of the
nodes and distributes them respectively. In Zhou and
Hass’ scheme, those certiﬁcates are fully stored in each
DCA node as well. This provides authentication from
potential threads of unauthorized nodes. Any unauthorized node does not have valid certiﬁcate, thus will
not get key shares from DCA nodes.
Assuming the threshold of the system is t, node i
needs to obtain at least t + 1 msk shares to retrieve the
msk. Node i will send out requests to t DCA nodes,
with a certiﬁcate of its own. Once the certiﬁcate is veriﬁed by a DCA node, which is achieved by comparing
with DCA’s certiﬁcate database, the DCA node will
reply with a share of msk. After successfully obtain t
valid key shares, node i will retrieve the msk.
This brings an imbalanced load to the DCA nodes,
because those DCA nodes are in charge of the whole
network. This scheme also requires pre-establishment
before the initiation. Certiﬁcates of each node are prestored in the DCA nodes.
In order to solve these problems, Yi and Kravers proposed a modiﬁed model [6]. It makes use of the broadcast certiﬁcation request (CREQ) and the certiﬁcation
reply (CREP) packets. It allows nodes to broadcast the
certiﬁcation request (CREQ) packets using a ﬂooding
method. Any DCA which gets this packet answers with
a certiﬁcation reply (CREP). If the node successfully
collects t + 1 CREPs, it will be able to reconstruct the
full certiﬁcate. If the certiﬁcate is valid, the certiﬁcation is successful; otherwise, the node will generate
another CREQ packet.

AODV Ad-hoc on-demand distance vector (AODV)
routing protocol is an on-demand routing protocol in
MANET proposed by Perkins, Belding-Royer and Das
[10, 7]. In this protocol, nodes do not perform routing
until a request is generated or received. It uses three
types of control messages: Route Request (RREQ),
Route Reply (RREP) and Route Error (RERR) to control the whole network.
In order to discover a Destination Node (DN), the
source node (SN) broadcasts a RREQ message. A sequence number is given to each node which has received
a RREQ message. When this RREQ message ﬁnds its
way to the DN, a RREP message is generated, sending
back to the SN the same way the RREQ came from,
and thus a route is established. After this, this route
will be assigned with a lifetime. Every time a message
is transferred via this route, the lifetime is refreshed.
When the lifetime is expired, the route becomes invalid.
MANET Security MANET is equipped with some
security aspects. It has neither pre-existing infrastructure nor predictable network topology, so data is transferred through nodes in a multi-hop way. The resources
of a MANET device, such as battery life or transmitting range, are always limited.
However its physical security is poor. This means
that MANET devices can be easily stolen and the physical signals that a MANET device uses may also be
vulnerable to a spooﬁng attack.
When discussing MANET security, we mainly consider two approaches: the key management and routing security. In this paper, we merely consider the key
management schemes. The key management schemes
handle the generation, establishment and distribution
and revocation of keys. We will elaborate the three
main key management schemes in MANET in the following section.

Fully distributed authority scheme A fully distributed authority scheme is a modiﬁcation of partially distributed certiﬁcate authority scheme ﬁrstly
proposed by Luo et al. [5]. This scheme also makes
use of the (n, t) threshold secret sharing scheme [12].
The diﬀerence between Luo et al.’s model and Zhou
3

and Hass’ model relies on the following: In Zhou and
Hass’ model, DCA nodes are randomly selected from
all the nodes while Luo et al’s model uses all of the
nodes in the MANET to form the DCA. The msk is
shared among all the nodes and for this reason, this
scheme is called ‘fully distributed’.
Firstly, an oﬄine trusted third party (OTTP) generates an RSA key pair mpk/msk . The mpk is shared
in the MANET. The msk is divided into n shares; each
part is a Secret Key (sk) for every node. Nodes’ Public
Keys (pk) are created from those sks.
Then the OTTP creates certiﬁcates signed with the
msk for each node, in order to bind nodes’ unique ID
with nodes’ public key. These certiﬁcates are unforgeable and are stored in every node in the network.
When a node, namely, node A, needs to get the msk,
it sends out requests to all its one hop neighbouring
nodes. If one of the neighbour nodes, namely, node B,
gets the request, it compares node A’s ID and certiﬁcate pair with the information B stored in its database.
If the result is positive, node B will send back its own
share of the msk, as well as the certiﬁcate of itself. If
the number of the nodes which replied with valid certiﬁcates and key shares is more than t, the node A
obtains the msk.

(DKGC). After the initiation, the KGC will go oﬄine,
and the network becomes self-organized. We deﬁne
those nodes that get partial secret keys from the KGC
to be the original nodes, those nodes that get partial
secret keys from DKGC to be the new-joint nodes and
those nodes that collectively form the DKGC to be
DKGC nodes.

ID-Based distribution scheme One of the
Identity-based authority schemes was proposed by
Boneh and Franklin [4], which is an upgraded solution
to Zhou and Hass’ scheme. It replaced the DCA with a
threshold private key generator (PKG). Initially, users
in the network will collectively form the PKG. This
PKG will generate a pair of mpk/msk, and the msk is
divided and shared among all the initial nodes. It is
not stated in [4] how this PKG is formed nor how the
msk is distributed. In [2],Van Der Merwe, Dawoud
and McDonald designed an OTTP which is called centralized PKG to generate and distribute keys. After
the initiation, the user’s identity is used as the user’s
public key, while each PKG node will generate a part
of this user’s private key, which is based on the user’s
identity. In this way, each user needs to obtain t + 1
parts of private key to retrieve the private key.

• Extract-partial-secret-key-share-andmaster-secret-key-share:
This algorithm takes as input the master public
key mpk, the master private key share msksi
from a DKGC node and an identity new of a
new-jointly node. It outputs a share of partial
user private key new,i and a share of master
secret key share msksnew,i , i ∈ {0, 1...n}. This
algorithm runs by DKGC nodes.

3
3.1

• Setup:
This algorithm takes as input a security parameter
1k and returns the master private key msk and
master public key mpk. This algorithm is run by
the KGC, in order to setup a certiﬁcateless ad hoc
system.
• Extract-partial-secret-key:
This algorithm takes as input the master public
key mpk, the master private key msk and an iden∗
tity ID=i∈ {0, 1} . It outputs a partial private
key i . This algorithm runs by KGC once at the
initiation of the network.
• Extract-master-secret-key-shares:
This algorithm takes as input the master private
∗
key msk and an identity ID=i∈ {0, 1} .It outputs
a master secret key shares msksi . This algorithm
runs by KGC once at the initiation of the network.

• Extract-master-secret-key-shares-DKGC:
This algorithm takes as input the master public key mpk, an identity ID=new ∈ {0, 1}∗ , and
t shares of master private key share msksnew,i ,
i ∈ {0, 1...n}. It outputs a master secret key share
msksnew . This algorithm runs by the new-joint
node.
• Extract-partial-secret-key-DKGC:
This algorithm takes as input the master public
key mpk, a user identity ID=new and t shares
of partial user private key new,i , i ∈ {0, 1...}.
It outputs a user partial secret key new . This
algorithm runs by the new-joint node.

CL-PKE over MANET
Generic Model

We assume that at the beginning of the network there is
a Key Generator Center (KGC) which generates partial
secret keys for all the users. We also denote n to be
the number of original nodes and t to be the pattern of
security level of the threshold system. Those n nodes
collectively form a Distributed Key Generator Center

• Set-user-keys:
This algorithm takes as input the master public
key mpk, a user identity ID=i, a partial private
key i and a secret value xi . It outputs a user
4

public/private key pair (pki /ski ) or an error symbol. This algorithm runs by all the nodes.

2. Once a DKGC node goes oﬄine, a random nonDKGC node will be picked. Other DKGC nodes
will give this node master secret key shares
msksnew,i , so that this chosen one will become
a new DKGC node. In this model, the number of
DKGC nodes does not increase.

• Encryption:
This algorithm takes as input the master public
key msk, a user’s identity ID=i, a user’s public
key pki and a message msg. It outputs a cipher
text c.
In our model,we pick all the initiation nodes to be the
DKGC nodes.The relationship among the number of
• Decryption:
DKGC nodes, the total number of nodes and threshold
This algorithm takes as input the master public of the system will be further discussed in Section 3.3.
key msk, a user’s private key ski and a cipher text
c. It outputs a message msg.

3.2
Fully Distributed System In the fully distributed system, all the nodes will have a share of msk.
They together maintain the stability of the system.
At the initiation stage, the KGC generates a master public/private key pair (mpk /msk ) using Setup
algorithm. It then generates user partial keys using Extract-partial-secret-key algorithm and divides msk with Extract-master-secret-key-shares.
The user partial keys ID and master secret key shares
msksID are distributed to all the origin nodes. Once
this is done, the KGC goes oﬄine, and all the original
nodes become DKGC nodes.
We use the threshold cryptography to provide authentication for new jointly nodes. A new-joint nodes
need to successfully contact at least t DKGC nodes.
Those DKGC nodes will run Extract-partial-secretkey-share-and-master-secret-key-share algorithm
for the new-joint node. Once this new-joint node obtains t shares of msksnew,i and t shares of new,i ,
it will be able to derive a master secret key share
msksnew and a partial secret key new by Extractmaster-secret-key-shares-DKGC and Extractpartial-secret-key-DKGC respectively, and it becomes a DKGC node. The number of DKGC nodes
rises with the increase of node numbers.
DKGC nodes use Set-user-keys algorithm to calculate their own public/private keys. The public keys will
be broadcasted all through the network so that nodes
can communicate to each other with Encryption and
Decryption algorithms.

Proposed Scheme

The ﬁrst certiﬁcateless public key encryption scheme
was proposed by Al-Riyami and Paterson. We incorporate their work and adopt it to MANET key management with CL-PKE. The scheme is as follows:
• Setup:
We assume IG is a Bilinear Diﬃe-Hellman parameter generator and k is the security parameter
for the system. This algorithm has four steps.
1. Run the IG generator on an input k, it outputs G1 , G2 , e where G1 and G2 are groups
of prime order q. e: G1 × G1 → G2 is a pairing.
2. Choose an arbitrary generator P ∈ G1 .
3. Select a master private key msk uniformly at
random from Zq∗ and set P0 = msk × P.
4. Choose four cryptographic hash functions
H1 : {0, 1}∗ → G1 , H2 : G2 → {0, 1},
m
m
H3 : {0, 1} × {0, 1} → Zq∗ and H4 :
m
m
{0, 1} → {0, 1} , here m will be the bitlength of plaintexts.
The
master
public
key
mpk
=
The masG1 , G2 , e, m, P, P0 , H1 , H2 , H3 , H4 .
ter private key is msk ∈ Zq∗ . The message
m
space is M = {0, 1} and the ciphertext space
2m
C = {0, 1} × G1 .
• Extract-partial-secret-key:
∗
This algorithm takes as input an ID ∈ {0, 1} and
carries out the following steps.

Partially Distributed System In a partially distributed system, a certain number of nodes will become
DKGC nodes. The msk is only shared between these
nodes. They are responsible for issuing partial secret
key for new coming nodes. This system diﬀers from
fully distribution system that :

1. Compute QID = H1 (ID) ∈ G1 .
2. Output the partial private key
QID ∈ G∗1 .

1. For a new-joint node, the DKGC nodes only issue partial secret key shares new,i , without any
master secret key shares msksnew,i .

ID

= msk ×

Any user can verify its partial secret key by checking e( ID , P) = e(QID , P0 ).
5

• Extract-master-secret-key-shares:
We assume a polynomial f (x) can be deﬁned as
f (x) = msk +

t


• Set-user-keys:
This algorithm takes as select a user’s secret value
xID ∈ Zq∗ , input the master public key mpk and
user’s partial secret key ID . It outputs user’s
secret key ID = xID × ID and user’s public
key pkID =< XID , YID >, where XID = xID P
and YID = xID mskP.

(ai xi )

i=1

Where a1 , a2 ...at are uniformly distributed over a
ﬁnite ﬁeld F. This algorithm takes as input an
∗
ID ∈ {0, 1} and outputs a master secret key share
msksi = f (IDi ). From this formula we can compute msk by
f (0) = msk =

t+1


• Encryption:
For a message msg ∈ M and an identity ID ∈
∗
{0, 1} with its public key pkID =< XID , YID >,
the encryption algorithm takes as follows:
1. Check the public key by e(XID , P0 ) =
e(YID , P). If the result is negative, abort the
encryption and output an error symbol.

[L̂(0, IDi ) × f (IDi )] ∈ Zq∗

i=1

and we also have
f (x) =

t+1


2. Compute QID = H1 (ID) ∈ G∗1 .
m

3. Choose a random number σ ∈ {0, 1} .

[L̂(x, IDi ) × f (IDi )]

4. Set r = H3 (σ, msg)

i=1

5. Compute and output ciphertext:

where L̂(α, β) is the appropriate Lagrangian coeﬃcients. Assuming S = {ID1 , ID2 , ID3 ...IDt+1 },
then

γ∈S,γ=β (α − γ)
L̂(α, β) = 
γ∈S,γ=β (β − γ)

c

=

< rP, σ ⊕ H2 (e(QID , YID )r ),
msg ⊕ H4 (σ) >

• Decryption:
Suppose c =< U, V, W >∈ C. To decrypt this
cipher text with private key skID :

• Extract-partial-secret-key-share-andmaster-secret-key-share:
Giving a master secret key share of node i msksi
and a new-joint node’s ID= new, this algorithm
takes the following steps.

1. Compute V ⊕ H2 (e(ID , U)) = σ  .
2. Compute W ⊕ H4 (σ  ) = msg  .
3. Set r = H3 (σ  , msg  ) and test if U = r P. If
not, output an error symbol and reject the
ciphertext.

1. A partial secret key share is calculated by
new,i = L̂(0, IDi ) × msksi × Qnew =
L̂(0, IDi ) × f (IDi ) × Qnew ∈ G1

4. Output msg  as the decryption of c.

2. A master secret key share is calculated by
• Correctness:

msksnew,i = L̂(IDnew , IDi ) × msksi ∈ Zq∗

σ

• Extract-partial-secret-key-DKGC:
This algorithm takes as input t partial secret key
shares new,i , the partial secret key new can be
calculated by
t+1
t+1
=
new
i=1 new,i =
i=1 L̂(0, IDi ) ×
f (IDi ) × Qnew = msk × Qnew ∈ G1

msg

• Extract-master-secret-key-shares:
This algorithm takes as input t master secret
shares msksnew,i and the msknew can be calculated by
t+1
msknew
=
=
i=1 msksnew,i
t+1
∗
i=1 L̂(IDnew , IDi ) × msksi = f (IDnew ) ∈ Zq



r P
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=

V ⊕ H2 (e(ID , U))

=
=

V ⊕ H2 (e(xID ID , rP))
V ⊕ H2 (e(xID msk ID , P)r )

=
=

V ⊕ H2 (e(QID , xID mskP)r )
V ⊕ H2 (e(QID , YID )r )

=
=

σ
W ⊕ H4 (σ  )

=
=

msg ⊕ H4 (σ) ⊕ H4 (σ  )
msg

=
=

H3 (σ  , msg  )P
H3 (σ, msg)P

=

U

3.3

Issues and design principles

CPU
Ram
Hard Disk
OS
GCC version
PBC lib version
GMP lib version

We incorporate a distributed system to replace the
KGC, so that the network becomes self-organized. This
fully distributed system is based on the threshold cryptography with two patterns (t, n). The pattern t represents the threshold of the model, which means any
t+1 malicious users can break the system (hence, the
system is upperbounded by t + 1, which means that as
long as there are at most t malicious users, then the
system is considered to be at the ‘secure’ state). The
pattern n represents the total number of users. We
denote n’ to be the maximum number of users, and t’
to be the number of malicious users in the network at
the initiation state. t’ should be less than t to get the
network initiated.
Unfortunately, we cannot anticipate if a new-joint
node is malicious or not. If the system is based on
fully distributed model, then in the worst case, all the
new-joint nodes are malicious, which add up to n’-n+t’
malicious DKGC nodes. In order to keep the system
running well, this n’-n+t’ should be smaller than t.
The system becomes vulnerable when t-t’ nodes join
the network.
If the system is based on the partially distributed
model, every DKGC sends its data to a random non
DKGC node before it goes oﬄine. When t-t’ original
nodes goes oﬄine, and they all replicate themselves to
new-joint node, the system becomes vulnerable.
Fully distributed systems are more eﬃcient, but only
allow a small number of new-joint nodes. Partially
distributed system can be secure as long as certain
amount of origin nodes stay online, but it requires cooperation between DKGC nodes and new-joint nodes,
and it brings along with extra communication overhead
searching for DKGC nodes. Diﬀerent systems should
be chosen over diﬀerent scenarios.

4
4.1

Intel T2250 1.73GHz
1GB
80GB at 5400rpm
Ubuntu 7.01
4.1
0.4.17
4.2.2

Table 1: Programming Environment
Number of nodes
Keys from KGC
Key shares
Keys from DKGC

5
142.756
13.165
156.739

10
142.756
11.315
224.295

20
142.756
10.189
313.790

Table 2: Result of Simulation I

As shown in table 2, if the partial secret key
comes from the KGC, it takes 142.7ms for a node to
get its key. This time is consist of the time partial
secret key generated by the KGC and the time a
node generates its secret key/public key based on this
partial secret key. On the contrary, if the partial secret
key comes from DKGC nodes, the total generating
time increases to 156.7ms for a network with 5 nodes,
224.3ms for a network with 10 nodes and 313.8ms for
a network with 20 nodes. This time is comprised of
the time for each DKGC node to generate the partial
secret key shares (10-13ms) and the time the node
generates the key based on these shares.
Note that this time will not change too much
because all DKGC nodes generate partial secret key
shares separately and parallel. The reason that key
generating time is much higher than partial secret
key generating time is that the key generating process
involves a few pairing calculation over groups, while
the partial secret key generating process only involves
calculations over the inﬁnite ﬁeld.

Simulation
Simulation with C

Setup In this simulation, we implement our scheme
with C codes. The programming is based on Pairing 4.2 Simulation with OPNET
Based Cryptography library (PBC) and GNU MP li- Scenarios The second simulation runs over six scebrary (GMP), which deﬁne a large amount of eﬃcient narios:
functions over pairing calculations. The programming
1. 10 nodes in total running in partially distribution
environment is showing as follows:
system , consist of 5 DKGC nodes, 1 type I attacker, 1 type II attacker and 3 normal nodes.
Result In this simulation, we assume that the
network propagation delay is 0ms, which means once
the partial secret key is generated, it will be sent to
the correspondent node immediately.

2. 10 nodes in total running in fully distribution system , all of them are DKGC nodes, consist of 1
type I attackers, 1 type II attackers and 6 normal
nodes.
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Maximum Velocity
Mobility Model
Pause Time
Dimensions of Space
Radio Range
Initiation Time
Background Traﬃcs
Packet Size

10m/s
RWM
1 second
100m × 100m
35m
100 seconds
1 packet per second
1024bits

traﬃc, which is 1 packet per second in our simulation.
Once a packet received/generated, it take 0.04 second
for a node to process it. This 0.04 second is the OPNET standard average propagation and processing delay. This delay increases to 0.055 second for DKGC
nodes, which is because DKGC nodes need to have
some extra time (10-13ms) to calculate partial secret
key shares and validate public keys. The extra 10-13ms
comes from the result of simulation 1.

Table 3: The AODV Parameters
Result As we can see from the ﬁgures, in a network
3. 10 nodes running in pure AODV system, with 1 with 10 nodes, our scheme generates around 30 percent more traﬃc than a pure AODV network, but the
type I attacker and 1 type II attacker.
packet drop rate decreases to one quarter of pure net4. 20 nodes in total running in partially distribution work. The average route discovery time (0.38s) is a
system , consist of 10 DKGC nodes, 2 type I at- little higher than pure AODV network (0.32) at ﬁrst
tackers, 2 type II attackers and 6 normal nodes.
but than decreases to 0.13s which is 60 percent of the
pure AODV network(0.20s).
5. 20 nodes in total running in fully distribution system , all of them are DKGC nodes, consist of 2
type I attackers, 2 type II attackers and 16 normal nodes.
6. 20nodes running in pure AODV system, with 2
type I attackers and 2 type II attackers.
The attackers are deﬁned as follows:
• Type I attacker does not forward any packets. It
works simply as a sink.
• Type II attacker does wrong routing. It sends
packets to any node other than the correct node.
During the simulation, all the type II attackers
forwards their packets to type I attackers.
AODV parameters The parameters of AODV are
shown in Table 3.
In the simulation, all the nodes’ movement follows
the random waypoint model [9] with a pause time
of 1 second and a maximum velocity of 10m/s. This
mobility model deﬁnes that node will pick some random waypoint in the wireless domain and move towards the waypoint with a velocity randomly picked
between 0m/s(exclusive) and 10m/s(inclusive). Once
a node gets to its destination, it will pause for 1 second
and then move to the next waypoint. The movement
repeats till the end of simulation.
The space of the wireless domain is 100m × 100m,
and the propagation range for each node is 35 meters.
When the simulation starts, there is an initiation time
for 100 seconds, during which time, no traﬃc is generated, except that between nodes and the KGC. After
that stage, the KGC goes oﬄine and each normal node
(including DKGC nodes) will generate a background
8

In a network with 20 nodes, our scheme contributes
to the average route discovery time as well, around
0.41s with CL-PKE while 0.71s without CL-PKE.
Nevertheless, the packet drop rate is higher than pure
AODV network. This is probably because our scheme
produces a lot more traﬃc overhead and some of them
are dropped because of the Type I attacker.
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